Chapter 9:
Relief
IV. Attorney Fees
Court-awarded attorney fees are critical in preserving access to the courts for poor people. Recipients of Legal Services Corporation funds are prohibited from seeking attorney fees in most cases./151/ Other programs, however, depend on fees for their very survival. Without attorney fees, numerous federal laws protecting rights to housing, health care, and other necessities would remain unenforced. The risk of having to pay plaintiffs’ attorney fees frequently induces settlement and deters illegal governmental and corporate conduct. Therefore, legal aid advocates in non-LSC programs need to have a working knowledge of fee issues.
The subject of court-awarded attorney fees has inspired books, even multivolume treatises./152/ This section instead focuses briefly on the major issues presented in fee litigation: how a plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party; entitlement to fees; how to calculate a reasonable fee; timing of fee motions and the “Jeff D. problem” of defendants forcing plaintiffs’ counsel to waive fees as a condition of achieving a settlement on the merits.
IV.A. Prevailing Party Standard After Buckhannon
To qualify for a fee award under most federal fee-shifting statutes, a litigant must be a “prevailing party.” Two issues that often arise are (1) how much the litigant has to win and (2) what form the victory must take.
As for the first question, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not win every single issue or even the “central issue” in order to obtain prevailing party status. A prevailing party is “one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought . . . .”/153/ Losing on some issues may or may not result in a reduced fee-award amount./154/ It does not affect “the availability of a fee award vel non.”/155/
The second question—what form the victory must take—became problematic after Buckhannon Board v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources./156/ In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that voluntary change in behavior by a defendant caused by a pending lawsuit did not qualify the plaintiff as a prevailing party for fee purposes. After Buckhannon, whether a plaintiff who is victorious in a practical sense is a prevailing party for fee purposes depends roughly on how much judicial involvement was involved in the victory.
At one end of the spectrum, winning a judgment obviously qualifies a plaintiff as a prevailing party in most cases. The major qualification is that the judgment must require “some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant.”/157/ A judicial declaration alone does not suffice. The judgment may be for nominal relief, although in such cases a court may deny fees altogether to the prevailing plaintiff./158/
At the other end of the spectrum, under Buckhannon, simply filing a lawsuit that prompts defendants to change illegal behavior voluntarily (i.e., acting as a “catalyst”) does not qualify the plaintiffs as prevailing parties. The Buckhannon Court disapproved the catalyst theory of recovery because it permitted an award “where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.”/159/ Even in such situations, however, plaintiffs’ counsel may still seek a final judgment if the interests and desires of the clients permit. Defendants are likely to claim that their voluntary changes in policy render the case moot. As the Buckhannon Court noted, however, mootness is to be found only when “it is clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”/160/
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are victories achieved either by interlocutory orders or by settlement. Even in pre-Buckhannon jurisprudence, winning an interlocutory order that merely kept a suit alive did not transform litigants into prevailing parties./161/ Nor are plaintiffs who obtain preliminary injunctions, but ultimately lose on the merits./162/ There is also disagreement in the circuits on how much “judicial imprimatur” is needed for a settlement agreement to qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party./163/ Buckhannon states on one hand, that a plaintiff who secures a court-ordered consent decree is a prevailing party./164/ On the other hand, a litigant who achieves success through a “private settlement” is not./165/ Private settlements lack the “judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees” and often cannot be enforced in federal court./166/ The Ninth Circuit dismissed this portion of Buckhannon as “dictum” and has refused to follow it./167/ However, most courts will follow Buckhannon in its entirety./168/ These courts will have to determine whether a particular agreement is closer to a consent decree or to a private settlement./169/ The major factors that the courts have looked at are the extent to which the settlement terms are incorporated into the district court order, and whether the district court retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement./170/
IV.B. Entitlement to Fees Under Major Fee-Shifting Statutes
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that she is a prevailing party, showing entitlement to fees is usually not difficult.
IV.B.1. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and Other Statutes:
Double Standard for Plaintiffs and Defendants
Some statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, provide that a prevailing plaintiff “shall” be entitled to fees./171/ Other statutes, such as the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, specify that a court “may” award fees to the prevailing party./172/ Recognizing, however, that statutes such as Section 1988 are private attorney general measures intended to encourage litigation enforcing important rights, the courts employ a double standard. A “prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’”/173/ By contrast, a “prevailing defendant may recover an attorney’s fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.”/174/
Section 1988, the most widely used fee-shifting statute, authorizes fee awards in actions to enforce civil rights laws, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A lawsuit that redresses a state or local government violation of rights guaranteed by federal statute is a Section 1983 action within the meaning of Section 1988 and may thus qualify for a fee award./175/ State governments do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity against Section 1988 fee awards./176/
IV.B.2. Equal Access to Justice Act—Substantial Justification Standard
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) presents different entitlement questions. Under the EAJA a party who prevails in litigation against the federal government “shall” be awarded fees “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified . ...”/177/ The federal government has the burden of demonstrating substantial justification in both law and fact./178/ If either the government’s prelitigation position or its litigation position lacks substantial justification, the court shall award fees./179/
While the government is not automatically assessed fees merely because it loses a case, neither does it escape a fee award just because its position is not frivolous. To meet the substantial justification test, the government’s position must be “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,” which requires the government to demonstrate “a reasonable basis both in law and fact.”/180/
Although parties often argue that EAJA motions should be controlled by “objective factors” such as the number of times the issue on the merits was litigated previously, the Supreme Court has stated that none of these factors is dispositive in itself./181/ Most district courts decide substantial justification questions on an “I know it when I see it” basis. Once the district court grants or denies a motion, the court of appeals is required to use a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard on appeal./182/
IV.C. Calculation of Reasonable Fees: The Lodestar Calculation
Under the leading case of Hensley v. Eckerhart, the amount of a statutory fee award is determined by the lodestar method: “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”/183/
IV.C.1. Reasonable Number of Hours
What constitutes “hours reasonably expended” is the most frequently debated question in fee litigation.
IV.C.1.a. Documentation Requirements
Courts and opposing counsel examine whether the hours are well documented. Some courts permit attorneys to reconstruct hours./184/ However, inadequate documentation may result in a reduced fee award./185/ Attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks should begin keeping contemporaneous time records as soon as they realize, erring on the side of over-inclusiveness, that a matter may become a case. They should record the date, the time spent to complete a task broken down into six-minute increments, and, most important, a sufficiently detailed description of what was done. As one court stated, records should give “enough information as to what hours were devoted to various activities and by whom for the district court to determine if the claimed fees are reasonable.”/186/ For example, “telephone call” or “research” are inadequate entries, but a court will approve “telephone call with Smith re failure to produce administrative record” or “research re summary judgment motion.”/187/ Ideally, there should be a separate entry for each telephone call, research project, or other activity. In the real world, as most courts recognize, attorneys in the heat of litigation “bundle” several activities into one entry and are rarely penalized for such block billing./188/
IV.C.1.b. Overall Billing Judgment Decisions
Hensley states that,“[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation ....”/189/ However, attorneys seeking court-awarded fees are expected to exercise voluntary “billing judgment,” excluding from a fee request “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary ....”/190/ In lengthy, multi-counsel litigation, where justifying every time entry or use of personnel would be difficult, some plaintiffs’ attorneys propose a voluntary across-the-board billing judgment reduction, which courts often appreciate./191/ In other instances, where particular recorded activity seems vulnerable, plaintiffs’ counsel should consider making discrete reductions.
IV.C.1.c. Compensable Phases of Litigation
A court may award fees for work on all phases of a lawsuit from prelitigation work,/192/ through postjudgment monitoring,/193/ including time spent on the fee issue itself./194/ There are some limits, however, on awards for prelitigation services. Time spent “years before the complaint was filed” is unlikely to be compensated./195/ Time spent in administrative proceedings must be “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the ...litigation ....”/196/ When a plaintiff can make that showing, however, a court may award fees for administrative advocacy even when that advocacy was directed at third parties./197/
IV.C.1.d. Compensable Activities
Space does not permit a discussion of which litigation activities are compensable and which are not. When a fee opponent challenges a particular activity, such as attorney travel time, a good place to start researching is one of the fee treatises./198/
Perhaps the most frequently occurring challenge is to time spent by co-counsel communicating with each other. The Supreme Court has held that district courts have discretion to include conferencing time in a fee award./199/ No court, to our knowledge, has denied compensation altogether for conferences./200/
A subsidiary issue in some cases is the number of hours spent on counsel communications. Plaintiffs may need to demonstrate to a district court, through copies of agendas or through lead counsel’s declarations, why the number of meetings held was necessary and how the meetings actually contributed to the efficiency of the litigation. When counsel do so, some courts award fully compensatory fees even when large numbers of conferencing hours are at issue./201/
IV.C.1.e. Compensation for Less than Complete Success
Fee opponents often seek reductions based on the argument that the plaintiffs were only partly successful. Plaintiffs rarely win all conceivable relief while prevailing along the way at every stage on all legal theories advanced. Courts do not, however, require that level of success to award fully compensatory fees.
Less than Complete Relief. Frequently plaintiffs win some, but not all, of the equitable relief prayed for, or relatively small amounts of money in damage cases. In neither event is a reduction in fees necessarily warranted. The Hensley Court deemed it insignificant that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief requested. For example, a plaintiff who failed to recover damages but obtained injunctive relief, or vice versa, may recover a fee award based on all hours reasonably expended if the relief obtained justified that expenditure of attorney time./202/ Lawsuits seeking only damages present different issues. The Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby held that if a plaintiff wins only nominal damages, a court “usually” denies fees altogether./203/ Even in nominal damage cases, however, as suggested by Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, a court may award higher fees. Whether it does depends on factors such as the difference between the damage amounts sought and awarded, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and whether the litigation vindicated a public purpose./204/ Several circuit courts have adopted Justice O’Connor’s analysis as the rule for nominal-damages cases./205/
The Court has rejected limiting the amount of fees in a civil rights damages suit to the same percentage that a personal injury lawyer would receive and affirmed a fee award that was nearly eight times the damages recovery./206/ Limiting fees to a percentage of the damages recovery would be inconsistent with the purpose of Section 1988, which “was enacted because existing fee arrangements were thought not to provide an adequate incentive to lawyers particularly to represent plaintiffs in unpopular civil rights cases.”/207/
Unsuccessful Proceedings. A prevailing plaintiff need not prevail at every stage in a suit to receive fully compensatory fees. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in refusing to reduce fees for time spent unsuccessfully defending against a writ of certiorari: “Rare, indeed, is the litigant who doesn’t lose some skirmishes on the way to winning the war.”/208/ Relying on Hensley, the Ninth Circuit analogized unsuccessful claims to unsuccessful proceedings where the plaintiff ultimately prevailed./209/
Unsuccessful Issues. Neither does a plaintiff need to win every issue raised in the complaint. Rather, fees for time spent litigating an unsuccessful claim are denied only where that claim “is distinct in all respects from . . . successful claims ....”/210/ By contrast, where “a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.”/211/ Claims are “related” under this analysis when they arise from the same facts or related legal theories./212/
IV.C.2. Reasonable Hourly Rates
In Blum v. Stenson the Supreme Court held that Section 1988 fees awarded to legal aid programs that do not charge their clients fees should be calculated at rates comparable to those charged by private attorneys in the community with comparable experience./213/ The Court rejected as inconsistent with the legislative history of Section 1988 the argument that fees should be limited to the internal costs of the relatively low salaries paid by legal aid programs.
IV.C.2.a. Market Rates and How to Prove Them
The Blum Court noted Congress’ direction that “‘the amount of fees awarded under [Section 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases ....’”/214/
The fee applicant has the burden of proving relevant market rates through evidence “in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits ....”/215/ This evidence often includes:
· declarations from attorneys in a range of private law firms in the relevant community reporting hourly rates charged by those firms for attorneys with the same law school graduation date as the fee applicant;/216/
- excerpts from hourly rate surveys;/217/
- fee award orders specifying past hourly rates awarded for the work of attorneys in the case; and
- other fee award orders in the jurisdiction stating hourly rates for attorneys of comparable experience.
IV.C.2.b. Frequently Occurring Hourly Rate Issues
Five frequently recurring issues concerning reasonable hourly rates follow:
First, the parties may disagree on which city’s prevailing rates apply when plaintiff’s counsel practices outside the forum jurisdiction. While this issue can cut both ways, it appears to occur most frequently when an out-of-town big-city lawyer wins in a jurisdiction where prevailing rates are relatively low. Generally the forum community’s rates are applicable unless the plaintiff can show that “local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.’”/218/ A declaration from the director of the legal services program serving the forum community sometimes can help prove this point.
Second, in suits lasting many years, the defendants may argue that compensation must be limited to “historical rates”: the market rates prevailing for each of the years the suit was litigated. The Supreme Court has held, however, that “an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment—whether by the application of current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise—is within the contemplation of [Section 1988].”/219/ Thus, in multiyear litigation against a defendant other than the federal government, a court should either award current rates for the entire case—the easiest solution—or award historical rates augmented by a multiplier to compensate for delay in payment./220/
Third, if the defendants are represented by law firms charging relatively low hourly rates, they may argue that plaintiffs’ counsel should be limited to those same rates. Noting that firms representing large institutional defendants such as governments and insurance companies charge low rates to keep repeat business, the courts have rejected these arguments. These firms are “not in the same legal market as private plaintiff’s attorneys who litigate civil rights cases.”/221/
Fourth, defendants often seek reduction in hourly rates or an overall fee reduction by contending that too much of the work on behalf of the plaintiffs was done by experienced attorneys at the high end of the hourly rate scale. Fee opponents often argue that plaintiffs’ counsel should not be awarded “big firm rates” because a large firm would have litigated the case differently, assigning most of the work to associates. One or two courts have accepted this argument./222/ Most have rejected it for two reasons. First, small firms and legal aid programs do not have the same luxury as do big firms in choosing to throw armies of associates into the fray./223/ More important, the reason experienced attorneys command higher hourly rates, the courts have realized, is that they are often much more efficient: “Presumably, the skill and experience of the partners places them further along the learning curve and enhances their ability to operate efficiently so that the higher partner rate is likely to be offset, at least in part, by a reduction in the number of hours multiplying that rate.”/224/
Fifth, defendants may argue that compensation for the work of paralegals and law clerks should be limited to the hourly rates that plaintiffs’ counsel paid them rather than market rates. The Supreme Court, however, has held that courts should compensate paralegal and law clerk time at market rates if the prevailing practice in the relevant community was to bill that time separately./225/
IV.C.2.c. Equal Access to Justice Act Hourly Rate Issues—Statutory Cap and Exceptions
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) presents an entirely different framework for computing hourly rates. Under the EAJA attorney fees are limited to $125 per hour, subject to certain exceptions./226/
Inflation Adjustment. Hourly rates may be adjusted to account for increases in the cost of living since March 1996, when Congress set the EAJA hourly rate limit at $125./227/ Although an inflation increase is not automatic, in practice most courts award it, usually unopposed. The adjusted hourly rate equals $125 per hour increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index for urban consumers (CPI-U)./228/ Unlike with other fee statutes, courts must use historical rather than current rates in awarding EAJA fees because of sovereign immunity concerns./229/ Thus, in multiyear litigation the rate for each year is $125 increased by the percentage CPI-U hike from March 1996 through that year./230/
Market Rates for Special Expertise and in Other Situations. An EAJA fee applicant may be awarded higher market rates if “the court determines that ...a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.”/231/ This requires an extensive showing that (1) the prevailing attorneys possessed specialized expertise; (2) the expertise was needed in the litigation; and (3) the skills needed could not have been obtained at the normal EAJA rates./232/
As for the first factor, the Supreme Court held that possessing exceptional litigation skills is not good enough. The prevailing attorney must have “distinctive knowledge or specialized skill . . . .”/233/ The circuit courts have taken different approaches in construing the Underwood requirements. The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Underwood to allow an enhancement in situations where the attorneys had specialized expertise in a particular area of law./234/ By contrast, the D.C., Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have construed Underwood quite narrowly./235/ Most other circuit courts have not squarely addressed this issue.
Even when the prevailing attorney possesses specialized expertise, the attorney must make a strong factual showing that the case could not have been brought by a smart generalist. Lead counsel should demonstrate to the court how the suit could only have been litigated by attorneys with existing contacts in the field or knowledge of hard-to-access rules and authorities. Plaintiffs also need to submit a declaration from a knowledgeable attorney showing the absence of other qualified counsel to litigate such a case.
In addition to authorizing fees generally against the government when no substantial justification can be shown for the government’s position, the EAJA subjects the federal government to fees “to the extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specially provides for such an award.”/236/ Under this provision, market rates are awarded under equitable fee doctrines such as when the government acts in bad faith, and under statutes other than the EAJA that both apply to the federal government and have fee-shifting provisions./237/
IV.C.3. Multipliers
Earlier Supreme Court cases such as Hensley contemplated that the lodestar could be augmented by a multiplier in appropriate circumstances./238/ Later cases, however, rendered the multiplier virtually extinct in federal court. Most prominently, the Court in City of Burlington v. Dague held that courts may not award contingency multipliers to account for either the exceptional riskiness of a particular case or the riskiness of certain kinds of litigation./239/ Previously, the Court had discouraged the use of multipliers based on such factors as the novelty and difficulty of the litigation or the exceptional quality of the representation; the Court reasoned that these factors are generally subsumed within the lodestar./240/
The only basis for a multiplier that the Supreme Court has approved is for delay in payment. In lengthy litigation a district court may compensate counsel for delay by a multiplier or by using current rather than historical rates./241/
Post-Dague multipliers are rare as well in the lower courts, though there are exceptions. Two courts have approved multipliers based on the extreme unpopularity of a case./242/ Another court ordered a multiplier for exceptional results after a 36-year landmark desegration lawsuit./243/ In addition, where a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and state law permits multipliers, federal courts are free to augment the lodestar./244/
IV.D. Timing of Fee Petitions
Neither Section 1988 nor most federal fee-shifting statutes specify when the fee motion must be filed.
IV.D.1. Civil Rights Act and Most Other Cases—Governed by Rule 54 and Local Rules
Rule 54(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires fee motions to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court ....” For purposes of this rule, a local rule setting a different fee motion deadline is an “order of the court,” and the local rule governs./245/
Some local rules, however, also impose short deadlines for fee motions, which may require counsel to seek an order postponing the deadline or to postpone having a judgment entered until fee papers are prepared. Rule 54 requires only that the fee applicant state the basis for an award and either the amount or “fair estimate” of the amount; thus, the rule appears to permit counsel to file placeholder motions with details to be filled in later.
IV.D.2. Equal Access to Justice Act Timing Issues
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) requires fee motions to be filed within 30 days of “final judgment.”/246/ This in turn is defined as “a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement.”/247/
Fee petitions may also be filed pending appeal; the EAJA merely precludes fee petitions after the 30-day limit./248/ Fee claimants and the government argued for years over what starts the EAJA clock running in Social Security Act cases until the Supreme Court decided the issue in Shalala v. Schaeffer./249/ A plaintiff is a prevailing party, the Court held, when she obtains a “sentence four remand” under the Social Security Act: “a judgment modifying or reversing the decision of the Secretary . ...”/250/ By contrast, a “sentence six remand,” which merely contemplates that new evidence will be introduced is not a judgment for attorney-fee purposes./251/ Thus, a sentence four remand has the potential to start the clock running for an EAJA fee motion.
The Schaeffer Court also held, however, that a sentence four remand order merely triggers the duty to enter judgment and is not a judgment itself. For the 30-day clock to begin running, the district court, pursuant to Rule 58, must enter a judgment “on a separate document.”/252/
IV.E. The "Jeff D.” Problem--Forced Fee Waivers
Ordinarily a non-federally funded legal services organization agrees to represent the client without charging a fee, except for recovering court-awarded fees. There are two potential problems with defense settlement offers in most cases handled by legal aid attorneys whose offices are able to obtain fees: (1) the offer is conditioned upon waiver of attorney fees or (2) in cases seeking monetary relief, the defendant offers a lump-sum inclusive of all damages and attorney fees and does not identify the amount of the award allocated to fees. Simultaneously negotiating the best settlement terms for the client and an award of fees for the legal work can create a conflict of interest between attorney and client.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this problem, but has decided that encouraging settlements is a more important policy objective than helping plaintiff’s attorneys avoid an ethical challenge. In Evans v. Jeff. D., the Court held that conditioning a settlement offer on the merits on plaintiffs waiving their claim for Section 1988 fees is permissible./253/ Jeff D. has made it very difficult to challenge attorney fee waiver settlement offers, but not impossible. At least two courts, relying upon dictum in Jeff D., have held that suits may proceed challenging an alleged wholesale government policy of demanding fee waivers to deny counsel to disfavored classes of litigants./254/
Because such suits would not be easy to litigate and win, the goal should be to avoid Jeff D. offers in the first place. Some private attorneys have done so by including a provision in the client retainer agreement stating the attorney’s hourly rate, and specifying that the client owes that amount if the client, against attorney’s advice, accepts a settlement offer that precludes a fee recovery.
This is not a viable option for legal services programs. For legal services attorneys, the key to minimizing Jeff D. problems is appropriate communication with opposing counsel and with clients. Some opposing counsel, who would never think to make a Jeff D. offer to a private attorney, might make such an offer to a legal services attorney, seeking to take advantage of his or perceived idealism. Legal services attorneys need to convey to opposing counsel and the entire legal community, through consistent word and action, that of course, in addition to relief for their clients, they expect their programs to be paid no matter what. Consistently conveying this attitude will discourage Jeff D. offers. Client communication is also critical. Clients who are educated on the importance of the case and kept well informed throughout the litigation have been known to reject Jeff D. offers.
Even when there is no demand for waiver of fees, incorporating fees in a lump-sum settlement offer presents a serious challenge to the plaintiff’s attorney. The attorney must negotiate the maximum monetary and non-monetary relief for the client while also trying to recover fees. Because law firms representing indigent civil rights plaintiffs typically limit their requirement for the client to pay attorney fees to what can be recovered from the defendant, there is also an ethical challenge when the lump-sum does not allocate the portion of the award that represents the amount included for the fees of the plaintiff’s attorney. The legal aid programs addressing these challenges have concluded that the client retainer agreement needs to address specifically the possibility of a lump-sum settlement offer. The agreement needs to specify that the fees will be calculated in a certain way, and that an accounting of the total fees will be shown to the client at the time a settlement offer is made. Even with full disclosure and agreement from the client, negotiating these lump-sum settlement offers is challenging.
151. 45 C.F.R. § 1642.3.
152. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, 2 Section 1983 Litigation, Statutory Attorney's Fees (3d ed. 1997).
153. Tex. Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989).
154. See Section IV.C.1 infra.
155. Texas Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 793.
156. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53,373).
157. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987).
158. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
159. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
160. Id. at 609 (quoting Friends of Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). Mootness is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this Manual.
161. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
162. Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007) (although declining to decide whether, without an adverse decision on the merits, a preliminary injunction winner may be a prevailing party).
163. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
167. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002) (Clearinghouse No. 54,396).
168. See, e.g., Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 25 (1st. Cir. 2004); John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with Barrios).
169. For a discussion on how to structure settlements in light of Buckhannon, see Section I supra.
170. See, e.g., Doe v. Hogan, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003); Am. Disability Ass’n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 278-81 (4th Cir. 2002) (Clearinghouse No. 51,346); Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1135 n.5; Truesdell v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002). But see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002), where a divided court held that only a judgment or a consent decree would be sufficient to confer prevailing party status.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For a list of other federal attorney-fee provisions, see Gary E. Smith, Federal Statutory Attorney Fees: Common Issues and Recent Cases, 28 Clearinghouse Review 744, 746 (Nov. 1994).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
173. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 428 (1983).
174. Id. at 428 n.2, citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
175. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
176. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The fee petition must, among other things, affirmatively allege that the government’s litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 408 (2004).
178. Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1996); Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 584-85 (10th Cir. 1992).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D).
180. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
181. Id. at 568-69. In Pierce itself, for example, the Court did not find it dispositive that the government had lost 11 straight times on the same issue. Id. at 569. Neither did the Court agree with the government that a Supreme Court grant of certiorari and a stay on the same issue compelled a conclusion that the government’s position must have been substantially justified. Id.
183. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
184. See, e.g., Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1542 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
185. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
186. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1191 (3d Cir. 1990).
187. For a comparison of good and bad time records, see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 583 F. Supp. 40, 47 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
188. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1191; Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 63 F.R.D. 308, 321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
189. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
191. See, e.g., Davis, 976 F.2d at 1543.
192. Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
193. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986).
194. See, e.g., Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 344 ( 2d Cir. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), cited with approval, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 162 (1990). In Jean the Court held that, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), fees for time spent on the fee issue should be awarded without a separate inquiry over whether the government’s position on the fee issue was substantially justified.
197. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 558-59.
198. See, e.g., Schwartz & Kirklin, supra n.152, § 4.6 at 197-98 n. 95-96 (collecting cases dealing with compensability of travel time).
199. Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 n.6 (1986).
200. See, e.g., Cont’l Sec. Litig. v. Cont’l Sec. Corp. (In re Continental Securities Litigation), 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that unjustified across-the-board cuts in attorney fees for time spent in conference was an abuse of discretion); Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (in “a difficult case with significant social effects ... the participation of [four] attorneys ... in ... strategy conferences and negotiations ‘may indeed have been crucial .. .’”); Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs. Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 645 F. Supp. 437, 450 (D.D.C. 1986) (“conferences between attorneys to discuss strategy and prepare for oral argument are an essential part of effective litigation ... there is no reason or authority for allowing only one lawyer to charge for time that more than one lawyer justifiably spent”).
201. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (counsel compensated for 3,500 hours in conferences with co-counsel and clients); Riverside, 477 U.S. at 573 n.6 (affirming compensation for 197 hours of conversation between two attorneys); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. R.I. 1979), aff’d, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorneys fully compensated for 208 hours spent in conference). Compare In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (limiting compensation for conferencing hours to 10 percent of total fee request).
202. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 n.11.
203. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
204. Id. at 121-22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., O’Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming a lodestar fee award, where nominal damages award achieved individual plaintiff’s goal and served as a deterrent).
205. See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005), and cases cited there.
206. Riverside, 477 U.S. at 564-65, 581 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-86 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment and rejecting argument to limit fees to one-third of damages).
207. Id. at 586 (Powell, J., concurring).
208. Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991).
209. Id. (“Just as time spent on losing claims can contribute to the success of other claims, time spent on a losing stage of litigation contributes to success because it constitutes a step toward victory”).
210. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
213. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-96 (1984).
214. Id. at 893, citing S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976).
216. Specific hourly rate information is more persuasive than a declaration of a private attorney that merely says the attorney has looked over the rates sought and thinks they are “reasonable.” The latter type of declaration “might properly be characterized by a reviewing court as one given out of courtesy, but it provides little or no evidentiary support for an award.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).
217. See, e.g., Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8,14 (D.D.C. 2000) (relying upon National Survey Center and National Law Journal surveys to determine reasonable hourly rates in the District of Columbia). But see Davis, 976 F.2d at 1547 (rejecting reliance on a different survey because, among other reasons, the survey reported only statewide average rates rather than rates specific to San Francisco, where case was litigated).
218. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992)).
219. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989).
220. Because waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed, fee awards against the federal government after multiyear litigation may not include a multiplier for delay or be based on current hourly rates. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317-20 (1986).
221. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 1996). Accord Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. Georgia Board of Elections, 997 F.2d 857, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1993).
222. See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Bergna, 804 F. Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (awarding $300 per hour for some of the work by plaintiffs’ lead counsel, and $250 per hour (still a high rate for 1992) for less complex work).
223. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) (“plaintiff asserts that her counsel was essentially a sole practitioner with only part-time associates and law clerks during much of this litigation. If true, the district court’s reduction for what it saw as top-heavy staffing cannot be sustained.”).
224. American Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 72 F.3d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“often, as audits reveal, there is so much senior time billed for reviewing, revising, and discussing the document that it usually would be cheaper to have the senior lawyer simply sit down and draft it”). Accord Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1987); Muehler v. Land O’Lakes Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1379 (D. Minn. 1985); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 366 (D.D.C. 1983), reversed on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Gary Greenfield, Efficient Litigation: An Ethical Imperative? 20 American Lawyer 38 (Apr. 1994).
225. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284-89.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
227. Id.; Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Before 1996, the limit was $75 per hour, subject to the same statutory exceptions. Id.
228. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148.
229. Kerin v. United States Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2000); Masonry Masters Inc. v. Nelson, 105 F.3d 708, 711-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
230. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
232. Rueda-Menicucci v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 132 F.3d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying rate increase where special expertise was unnecessary to successful result); Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (7th Cir. 1995); Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1989).
233. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572.
234. See Raines, 44 F.3d at 1361 (“an identifiable practice specialty not easily acquired by a reasonably competent attorney” can be considered a special factor warranting fee enhancement); Pirus, 869 F.2d at 541-42 (fee enhancement available for specialized expertise in social security class actions); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 774 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d, 496 U.S. 154 (199) (immigration law expertise may qualify).
235. F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Magaw, 102 F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (market rate fees “available only for lawyers whose specialty ‘requir[es] technical or other education outside the field of American law’”); Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2000); Hyatt v. Comm’r, 315 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2002).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
237. See, e.g. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusal of federal government to follow binding circuit precedent in social security cases amounted to bad faith warranting market rate fees); D & M Watch Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992) (market rate fees when Customs Service acted in bad faith); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) (noting that Congress waived sovereign immunity to permit Title VII lawsuits and attorney-fee awards against the United States).
238. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
239. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
240. See, e.g, Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99. Counsel may wish to use this discussion to support relatively high hourly rates.
241. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284. But see Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321-23 (no compensation for delay in suits against the federal government).
242. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ado, 100 F.3d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1996); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
243. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 795-96 (6th Cir. 2004).
244. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 2.0 multiplier under California state law in discrimination case).
245. Tire Kingdom Inc. v. Morgan Tire & Auto Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court recently held that a timely fee petition could be amended after thirty days to cure a failure to allege that the government’s litigation position was not substantially justified. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G).
248. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1983); accord, Cervantez v. Sullivan, 739 F. Supp. 517, 519 (E.D. Cal. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Adams v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 287 F.3d 183, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that Congress, in amending the EAJA, adopted the McDonald approach).
249. Shalala v. Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
250. Id. at 300, citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), fourth sentence.
253. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
254. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2002) (Section 1988 suit); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42-44 (D.D.C. 2002) (provision in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, court relied in part on IDEA’s right to counsel provision to distinguish Jeff D.).