Chapter 2: Jurisdiction
IX. State Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims
In determining whether state courts were allowed to entertain jurisdiction over federally created causes of action, the Supreme Court applied a presumption of concurrency./322/ Under this presumption, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over federally created causes of action as long as Congress does not explicitly or implicitly make federal court jurisdiction exclusive. An implied exclusivity can result from an “unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interest.”/323/ In considering whether a federal claim is incompatible with state court jurisdiction, the Court looks to “the desirability of uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.”/324/
Under this framework, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty, bankruptcy, patent, trademark, and copyright claims because the relevant jurisdictional statutes expressly provide so./325/ In other areas, such as antitrust, the federal statutes do not make federal court jurisdiction exclusive, but courts found an implied exclusivity./326/ State courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983./327/ Although the Court has not expressly addressed state court jurisdiction over the other Reconstruction-era civil rights actions, it reviewed a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 action arising in the state courts without any apparent doubt about the permissibility of state courts to entertain such actions./328/ Moreover, state courts addressing issues involving 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, both having their origins in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its 1870 reenactment, concluded that they were allowed to entertain such actions./329/
State courts, the Supreme Court held, may exercise jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims./330/ However, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether they were required to exercise such jurisdiction. In Howlett v. Rose the Court was asked to decide whether common-law sovereign immunity was available to a state school board to preclude a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though such a defense would be unavailable in federal court./331/ The state court had dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that the school board, as an arm of the state, had not waived its sovereign immunity in Section 1983 cases. The Howlett Court stated that state common-law immunity was eliminated by acts of Congress in which Congress expressly made the states liable./332/The Court held that the state court’s refusal to entertain a Section 1983 claim against the school district, when state courts entertained similar state-law actions against state defendants, violated the Supremacy clause./333/
Virtually every state addressing the issue holds that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over Section 1983 actions, and Section 1983 actions are now routinely heard in state courts. Moreover, Section 1983 cases are now reported from virtually every state in which the appellate courts of that state expressly or impliedly agree to hear them.
By statute, state courts are authorized to hear claims arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act,/334/ the Equal Pay Act,/335/ and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act./336/ They also have jurisdiction over Title VIII actions involving housing discrimination./337/ State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims./338/
322. See, e.g., Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.130, 136 (1876). See generally Martin H. Redish & John Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (1976).
323. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477–78 (1981).
324. Id. at 483–84. See also Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 271 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing considerations of uniformity, federal expertise, and federal hospitality to federal claims).
325. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333–1334, 1338.
326. See, e.g., Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1976); Allied Mach. Serv. Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 841 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
327. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Martinez v. California , 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
328. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
329. See, e.g., Miles v. FERM Enters. Inc., 29 Wash. App. 61, 627 P.2d 564 (1981); see also DeHorney v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 879 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1989) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1981 suits). Cf. Filipino Accountants Ass’n Inc. v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 204 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (assuming state court jurisdiction over Section 1981 actions). State courts also consistently exercised jurisdiction over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and alleging conspiracies to deprive individuals of equal protection of the laws, a result which is not surprising considering the common origin of Section 1985 and Section 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See, e.g., Rajneesh Found. Int’l v. McGreer, 734 P.2d 871 (Or. 1987) (allowing Section 1985(3) counterclaim). State courts also assumed the availability of state court jurisdiction over Section 1985(2) claims involving the administration of justice in state courts. See Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 711 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. 1985).
330. The Supreme Court held that state courts possessed concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 actions. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); see also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980).
331. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
333. But see Nat’l Private Truck Council Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 587 n.4 (1995) (“We have never held that state courts must entertain § 1983 suits”) (citations omitted).
334. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
335. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206.
336. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (“any court of competent jurisdiction”).
337. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(A). See Marine Park Assocs. v. Johnson, 274 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
338. See Yellow Freight Sys. Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
Chapter 3: The Case or Controversy Requirement and Other Hurdles>